University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2

Article 22

1972

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination- Does a "Use"
Immunity Preserve the Rights of the Witness?

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination- Does a "Use" Immunity Preserve the Rights of the Witness?, 6 U. Rich. L. Rev. 428 (1972).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol6/iss2/22

This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Richmond Law Review by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-DOES A "USE" IMMUNITY
THE RIGHTS OF THE WITNESS?-Stewart v. United States

PRESERVE

The United States Constitution guarantees every person the privilege
of refusing to divulge self-incriminating testimony.' When the acquisition
of such testimony has been deemed necessary by the government, the
United States Supreme Court has upheld statutes which require the witness
to divulge the testimony, but only when such statutes have granted the
witness an immunity which is coextensive with his fifth amendment privilege.2 There are two concepts as to the adequacy of an immunity which
attempts to preserve the constitutional privilege of the witness: 1) a "transactional" immunity which renders the witness free from prosecution in a
subsequent criminal proceeding for any crime to which his testimony relates, 3 and 2) a "use" immunity which merely guarantees that the testimony
1 "No person ...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Wood v. United States, 128 F.2d 265 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
The privilege has sanction in the Bill of Rights, and before that in a long but

himself...."

victorious struggle of the common law. It protects against the force of the
court itself. It guards against the ancient abuse of judicial inquisition. Before
it judicial power, including contempt, to enforce the usual duty to testify,
desolves. No other violence or duress is needed to bring it into play than the
asking of a question. It excludes response regardless of its probative value. Id.
at 268.
See generally Corwin, The Supreme Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination
Clause, 29 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1930).
2See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), wherein Justice Blatchford,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that,
It is quite clear that legislation cannot abridge a constitutional privilege, and
that it cannot replace or supply one, at least unless it is so broad as to have
the same extent in scope and effect. Id. at 585.
A classic example of such a statute, providing transactional immunity, is the Act of
Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 which stated:
... [N]o person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, papers, tariffs, contracts, agreements, and documents before the
Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission, . . .on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or
subject him to a penalty or forfeiture: but no person shall be prosecuted or
subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing, concerning which he may testify ...
The constitutional validity of this statute was determined in Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896). See note 12 infra. See generally Annot. 53 A.L.R.2d 1030 (1957);
70 HARV. L. REv. 1454, 1461 (1957).
3 The word "transactional" encompasses the phrase "transaction, matter or thing"
which is employed in many "transactional" immunity statutes. See Act of Feb. 11,
1893, ch. 83, 27 Star. 443, note 2 supra; 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (1970).
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of the witness and the fruits thereof will not be used against him in a subse4
quent criminal proceeding.
In a recent case, Stewart v. United States,5 a grand jury witness refused
to answer self-incriminating questions authorized by a statute granting only
a "use" immunity. The witness was cited for contempt. On appeal the
Ninth Circuit upheld the defendant's contempt conviction, thereby deciding that the "use" immunity effectively protected the witness' fifth
6
amendment privilege in spite of the damaging testimony requested.
This result seems precluded by Counselman v. Hitchcock,7 a 1892 Supreme Court decision in which a "use" immunity statute was held invalid
because it did not adequately preserve the witness' privilege interdicting selfincrimination.8 The Court felt that a statute which merely protected the
witness from the use of such testimony as evidence, and which did not prevent the government from employing his testimony as incentive to discover
other evidence with which to convict him, was not coextensive with the
requirements of the fifth amendment.9 In order to be coextensive, an
4

For an example of a recently enacted "use" immunity statute, see Organized Crime
Control Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) which states:
Whenever a witness refuses, on the basis of his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or provide other information in a proceeding before or ancillary
to-

(1) a court or grand jury of the United States,
(2) an agency of the United States, or
(3) either house of Congress ....and the person presiding over the proceeding
communicates to the witness an order issued under this part, the witness
may not refuse to comply with the order on the basis of his privilege against
self-incrimination; but no testimony or other information compelled under
the order ... may be used against the witness in any criminal case ...
6440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir.); caert. granted sub nom. Kastigar v. United States, 402 Us.
971 (1971).
6 The Ste'wart court, in reference to the Organized Crime Control Act, 18 U.S.C.
6 6002 (1970) (see note 4 supra), said, "The statute now under question appears
clearly within the protective limitations of the Fifth Amendment... ." 440 F.2d at 957.
7 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
8 The statute under consideration in Counselman, R.S. § 860 (1879), provided that:
No pleading of a party, nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of a judicial proceeding in this country... shall be given
in evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property or estate, in
any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty or forfeiture. ....
9 Referring to the "use" immunity statute, R.S. § 860 (1879) (see note 8 supra)
the Counselman Court statedThis, of course, protected him against the use of his testimony against him or
his property in any prosecution against him or his property, in any criminal
proceeding, in a court of the United States, But it had only that effect. It
could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out
other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal
proceeding in such court. It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of
witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony
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immunity statute must grant the witness immunity from prosecution for
any charge relating to his testimony in response to inquiry. 10 A statute
which subjects a witness to subsequent prosecution does not adequately
fulfill constitutional requirements." An examination of the Supreme Court
'cases following Counselman reveals that the doctrine formulated in that
case is still law as it has not been overruled either sub silentio or by express
12
language.
The court in Ste'wart 3 felt that Counselman had been overruled since
a "use" immunity was found to be constitutionally valid in Murphy v.
he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when
otherwise, and if he had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been
convicted.
The constitutional provision distinctly declares that a person shall not "be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself;" and the
protection of § 860 is not coextensive with the constitutional provision. Legislation cannot detract from the privilege afforded by the Constitution. 142 US.
at 564-65 (1892).
10 Justice Blatchford statedIn view of the constitutional provision, a statutory enactment, to be valid,
must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence to which
the question relates. 142 U.S. at 586.
11 The Counselnzan Court stated that it was,
clearly of the opinion that no statute which leaves the party or witness
subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege confered by the Constitution
of the United States. 142 U.S. at 585.
12 In Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the issue arose as a result of an alleged
incompatibility between the protection of the fifth amendment and the Act of Feb. 11,
1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (see note 2 supra), which provided the witness with "transactional" immunity. The Court, upholding the statute, said that the legislation was
passed as a result of Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), so as to provide
an immunity broad enough to grant the witness his constitutional protection. 161
U.S. at 594.
In 1906 the Supreme Court supported the result reached in Counselman when it
quoted language from that case to the effect that a valid immunity statute must grant
the witness immunity from prosecution for crimes to which his compelled testimony
relates. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
In 1960, the Court upheld the validity of an immunity statute, stating that:
• . . in safeguarding him against future federal and state prosecution "for or
on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which he is compelled"
to testify, the statute grants him immunity fully coextensive with the constitutional privilege. Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 514 (1960).
In 1965 the Supreme Court held that an immunity statute which does not fulfill
the Counselman requirement is not valid. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control
Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
"Justice after Justice has restated the concept that transactional immunity from
prosecution is the safeguard that is coextensive with the guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment." Catena v. Elias, 9 Crim. L. Rep. 2475 (3d Cir. 1971).
Is Stewart v. United States, 440 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1971).

19721

RECENT DECISIONS

431'

Waterfront Commission.14 Also, the court noted that although "transaction-,
al" immunity is a valid immunity there is no Supreme Court case which has
stated that "transactional" immunity is the only immunity that will suffice.' 5 :
Upon examination of the factual situation of Murphy, the Ste'wart court's
reliance upon that case as authority for the general proposition that a.
"use" immunity is constitutional appears unsound. The only issue confronting the Murphy Court concerned the degree of immunity which the
jurisdiction questioning the witness could confer upon him in regard to a
subsequent prosecution by another jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held
that the secondary jurisdiction was barred only from using the testimony
of the witness. The degree of immunity that must be conferred by the
questioning jurisdiction, the issue in Ste'wart, was neither discussed nor
resolved. 16 Several cases subsequent to Murphy have held that the rule in

U.S. 52 (1964).
The Stewart court stated that "[n]o case has been cited in which the Supreme
Court has held that only a transaction statute will suffice, and we have found none."
Stewart
v. United States, 440 F.2d 954, 956 (9th Cir. 1971).
16
In Murphy, the petitioners refused to respond to questions asked under an immunity granted by New York and New Jersey, on the ground that such testimony.
might incriminate them under federal law. The Court said:
... the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a state witness
against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness.
against incrimination under state as well as federal law. Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964).
The Court held that a state grant of immunity to a witness prevented the Federal
Government from using his compelled testimony in a subsequent criminal proceeding;
however, no mention was made in the case concerning the degree of immunity the
witness must be given by the questioning jurisdiction.
In In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (SD.N.Y. 1971), which held that the same "use"".
immunity statute appearing in Stewart was unconstitutional because the immunity it
granted was not broad enough, the court attempted to explain the effect of the
Murphy decision upon a situation similar to the one appearing in Stewart. The court
said that Congress had relied upon the decision in Murphy when it enacted the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (see note 4 supra) and that the government:
relied upon the Murphy decision for its claim that the Counselman requirement of
"transactional" immunity had been overruled sub silentio. The court felt that the
reason Murphy allowed a "use" immunity to be extended to a subsequent jurisdiction
was because of a consideration of federalism. This would enable the law enforcement
prerogatives of a non-questioning jurisdiction to encounter only a minimum of interference. The court stated,
The Murphy decision is, therefore, not properly cast as a sub silentio overruling
of Counselman's transactional immunity requirement as between the questioning
state and witness. 326 F. Supp. at 416.
Another federal case, Catena v. Elias, 9 CPum. L. REP. 2475 (3d Cit. 1971), holding
a "use" immunity invalid, attempted to explain the decision reached in Murphy. The
court pointed out that it would be unjust to hold that when one state grants
"transactional" immunity all other states must do the same for that particular witness.'
Accordingly Murphy merely prohibited other states from the use of the compelled
14 378
15
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Counselman is still controlling in factual situations similar to Stewart.'7
Although the Supreme Court has never expressly stated that a "transactional" immunity is the only immunity that could adequately fulfill the
constitutional requirement, it did establish the minimum standard for such
a statute when it said:
We are dearly of [the] opinion that no statute which leaves the party
or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating
question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States.' s
Such a statement implies that nothing less than immunity from prosecution
for acts of which the witness was compelled to testify can meet this minimum
standard. A "use" immunity is clearly too narrow. 9
Since 1892 the Supreme Court has held that a statute compelling selfincriminating testimony must grant the witness an immunity which provides
testimony. This prevents an intrusion by one state upon the judicial process of another,
or more accurately it results in less intrusion by one state upon the judicial process
of another than would exist if a "transactional' immunity were extended to the
witness.
The court in light of the close question as to whether the government may ever
grant an immunity sufficient to compel the witness to divulge incriminating testimony
saidMindful of this, courts have reluctantly sanctioned the immunity device, but
in doing so have minimized the erosion of Fifth Amendment protection by
insisting that the coercing state protect the witness against the possibility of
consequent harm as completely as it can. Id. at 2476.
The Murphy Court then, allowed the questioning jurisdiction to grant the witness
the greatest amount of immunity it could confer upon him, with respect to the
powers of subsequent jurisdictions.
17See Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965). In this
case the Supreme Court struck down an immunity statute because its provisions did
not sufficiently safeguard the witness under the Counselman standard. For other cases
so holding see e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 10 CRim. L. REP. 2094 (8th Cir. 1971);
Catena v. Elias, 9 CIuM. L. REP. 2475 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Korman, 9 CaiM. L. REP.
2161 (7th Cir. 1971); Carter v. United States, 417t F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Kinoy,
326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Gold v. Menna, 25 N.Y.2d 475, 255 N.E.2d 235
(1969). See also Piccrillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 552 (1971) (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ, dissenting):
I believe that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination requires that any jursdiction that compels a man to incriminate himself grant him
absolute immunity under its laws from prosecution for any transaction revealed
in that testimony. Id. at 562.
IsCounselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892).
9
1 See In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) where the court stated that a
"use-restriction immunity as opposed to prosecution immunity plainly does not protect
a witness against all of the perils which are manifestly within the orbit of the privilege:'
Id. at 418.

1972]

RECENT DECISIONS

him with protection that is as near as possible to that provided by the fifth
.amendment.20 Although the Court has allowed a "use"' immunity to be valid
in the Murphy situation it has been held consistently that when circumstances similar to those in Stewart arise, an immunity from all prosecution
21
concerning acts of which the witness gave testimony must be granted.
The Supreme Court will have an opportunity to resolve the issue in the
near future since it has granted certiorari in the Stewart case. 22 Hopefully
the Court will rule consistently with Counselman as it has for the past
seventy-nine years, thereby allowing the constitutional privilege of the witness to be preserved.

I.tH..

20 See cases cited note 12 supra.
21 See cases cited notes 12 & 16 supra.
22
See note 5 supra.

